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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MINNIE PEARL DALTON, as Ad-
ministratrix of the Estate of James 
F. Dalton, deceased, and MINNIE 
PEARL DALTON, 
Plaintiff and Appell'ant, 
vs. 
MAX DALTON, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8568 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
B. THE FACTS 
In this case the plaintiff filed an action to quiet title 
to the following described real property in San Juan County, 
State of Utah: 
"The West half of the Northeast quarter, the 
Southeast Quarter of the Northwest quarter and 
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the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of 
Section Twenty-six in Township Thirty-six South 
of Range Twenty-four East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
Utah, containing 160 acres. 
"Together with all improvements and appurten-
ances thereunto belonging." 
The defendants Max Dalton and Nell Dalton filed an 
answer denying the ownership by the plaintiffs and alleged 
that they are the owners of said real property subject only 
to a mortgage to the Mutual Life Insurance Company of 
New York (R. 7). The plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton, as 
the administratrix of the estate of James F. Dalton and in 
her personal capacity, claims title to the property by virtue 
of a patent from the United States Government issued on 
the 29th day of November, 1927 (Def. Ex. 5, p. 10). 
The defendants Max Dalton and Nell Dalton, his wife, 
claimed title from a chain of title derived from Daniel 
Perkins, and that the said James F. Dalton and lVlinnie 
Pear I Dalton conveyed their interest in said property to 
Daniel Perkins by warranty deed dated October 27, 1930 
(Def. Ex. 1). 
The plaintiff denies that the said warranty deed (Def. 
Ex. 1) was ever executed by the said James F. Dalton and 
Minnie Pearl Dalton, and that the property was ever con-
veyed to Daniel Perkins by said warranty deed. 
The defendants Max Dalton and his wife Nell Dalton 
offered evidence as part of their affirmative defense that 
they were the fee owners of the property, that the plaintiff 
Minnie Pear 1 Dalton and James F. Dalton, deceased, exe-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
cuted a warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) to Daniel Perkins, and 
that at the time of the execution of the deed an escrow 
agreement was signed and the deed placed with the San 
Juan State Bank, Monticello, Utah, in escrow (Def. Ex. 2), 
and that they derived the title to the property described in 
plaintiff's complaint by a chain of title from Daniel Perkins 
to the said Max Dalton and Nell Dalton, his wife, defen-
dants. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
DECEASED JAMES F. DALTON AND HIS 
WIFE lVIINNIE PEARL DALTON EXECUTED 
THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER 
27, 1930 (DEF. EX. 1), TO DANIEL PERKINS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT· THE 
ESCROW AGREEMENT (DEF. EX. 2) HAD 
BEEN COMPLIED WITH, AND THE WAR-
RANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER 27, 1930 
AND ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED BY JAMES F. 
DALTON AND MINNIE PEARL DALT·ON, 
GRANTORS, AND LEFT IN ESCROW WITH 
THE SAN JUAN STATE BANK HAD BEEN 
VALIDLY DELIVERED. 
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POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT MAX DALTON HAD 
ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE PROPERTY BY 
VIRTUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT· TO SUS-
TAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
DECEASED JAMES F. DALTON AND HIS 
WIFE MINNIE PEARL DALTON EXECUTED 
THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER 
27, 1930 (DEF. EX. 1), TO DANIEL PERKINS. 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the court's finding that James F. Dalton and 
Minnie Pearl Dalton signed and executed the purported 
warranty deed dated October 27, 1930 (Def. Ex. 1). 
The deed purports to have been executed on the 27th 
day of October, 1930 (Def. Ex. 1). The instrument purports 
to bear the signatures of both James F. Dalton, deceased, 
and Minnie Pearl Dalton, his wife. The preponderance of 
the evidence in this case establishes that the deed was 
never executed by Mr. and Mrs. Dalton. 
The· defendants produced an alleged deed which pur-
ports to have been signed by both Mr. and Mrs. James F. 
Dalton October 27, 1930, and the deed first appears and 
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was recorded November 5, 1948, by the defendants, eighteen 
years after its execution. The deed itself recites that the 
grantors were residents of Cortes, County of Montezuma, 
Colorado, and was signed on the 27th day of October, 1930, 
but was acknowledged on the 28th day of October, 1930 by 
Frank Halls, Notary Public, residing in Monticello, San 
Juan County, Utah. 
Frank Halls, the Notary Public who acknowledged the 
said deed, called as a witness, testified that the deed was 
not prepared by him, but was prepared before it was pre-
sented to him for his acknowledgement (Trans. 33). Mr. 
Halls further testified (Trans. 30-31) : 
"Q. Mr. Halls, was that document signed in 
your presence as a Notary Public? 
"A. Well, I would say so, yes. 
"Q. Were you acquainted with James F. Dal-
ton's signature aside from this notarized signature? 
"A. Yes, acquainted with James F. Not Minnie 
Pearl. 
"Q. Would you say this was James F. Dalton's 
signature? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Would you say that was Minnie Pearl 
Dalton's signature? 
"A. I would say so if I acknowledged it, yes." 
Mr. Halls further testified he was sure that the signa-
ture of James F. Dalton in Defendant's Exhibit 1 was Mr. 
Dalton's signature, but he was not sure it was Mrs. Dalton's 
signature (Trans. 32) : 
"Q. Now, just a moment, please. Answer the 
question. Why are you so sure it was the Daltons? 
"A. I am not sure it was her signature. I am 
sure it was Dalton's, all right." 
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Mr. Halls further testified (Trans. 32) : 
"Q. Did you see Mrs. Dalton any time in 1930? 
"A. I don't know now. I can't go back years. 
Dalton worked for me one year down there on my 
farm. 
"Q. You specifically remember that Mrs. Dal-
ton came in and signed a paper before you? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Do you specifically remember that Mrs. 
Dalton came in and signed this paper before you? 
"A. N o. 
"Q. You wouldn't swear that she came before 
you and signed this paper? 
"A. No, I don't remember the circumstances 
at all." 
The witness frankly admitted he did not remember the 
circumstances, but the witness was sure the deed bore the 
signature of Mr. Dalton, but he was not sure that it was 
the signature of Mrs. Dalton. Now, Mr. Halls was per-
mitted to testify over the objection of plaintiff's counsel 
that it was his practice to have the people present before 
him before he would take their acknowledgements and 
therefore she must have appeared before him; and it is 
on this testimony alone that the court based its findings 
that Mrs. Dalton signed the deed. 
The testimony of Mr. Halls, which was elicited by his 
counsel in redirect examination over the objection of plain-
tiff's counsel that it was his custom to have people per-
sonally present at the time he acknowledged an instrument 
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should be given very little credence, because of the testi-
mony of Mr. Halls in his direct examination (Trans. 32) : 
"Q. Do you specifically remember that Mrs. 
Dalton came in and signed this paper before you? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You wouldn't swear that she came before 
you and signed this paper? 
"A. No, I don't remember the circumstances at 
all." 
Now, if it 'vere a fact that it had been the practice of 
Mr. Halls not to acknowledge a paper unless the persons 
were present and there had never been any departures 
from this practice, the witness would not have so testified. 
If it were in fact his practice to have every person present 
before he acknowledged the instrument and he had never 
departed from that practice, there would have been no 
hesitation in swearing that Mrs. Dalton had appeared be-
fore him and signed the purported deed (Def. Ex. 1), but 
he was not sure and he 'vould not swear under oath that 
she appeared before him and executed the purported deed 
(Def. Ex. 1). 
That Mrs. Minnie Pearl Dalton never appeared before 
the Notary Public Halls and executed said purported war-
ranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) is supported by the preponderance 
of the testimony. The instrument itself recites that the 
grantors were residents of Cortes, Montezuma County, 
Colorado. There is no evidence that James F. Dalton and 
Minnie Pearl Dalton ever lived in Cortes, Montezuma 
County, Colorado. 
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Vve wish to bring to the attention of this court that 
Defendants' Exhibit 2, purporting to be a copy of a letter 
addressed to the State Bank of San Juan, Monticello, Utah, 
refers to a purported written agreement by and between 
the said James F. Dalton and George W. Perkins, Hyrum 
C. Perkins, and Daniel Perkins, all of Blanding, Utah, dated 
the 27th day of October, 1930. The letter reads in part as 
follows: 
"I hand you herewith a deed to said property 
under the terms of which the same is transferred to 
Daniel Perkins, one of said co-partners, and you 
are instructed the same is transferred to Daniel 
Perkins upon payment to me of the balance due on 
said contract according to its terms, or to return 
the same to me if default is made in making such 
:payments or any of them." 
The terms are then set out. 
This exhibit of the defendants recites on its face that 
the deed (Def. Ex. 1) was delivered to and accepted by 
the bank on the 27th day of October, 1927. The following 
day, October 28, the deed was acknowledged by Mr. Halls. 
The signatures were on the deed before the deed was pre-
sented to Prfr. Halls [O'r acknowledgement. Yet 1\fr. Halls 
testified under oath that the document was signed in his 
presence as a Notary Public (Trans. 30) : 
"Q. Now, lVIr. Halls, I am going to hand you 
what is marked for identification 'Defendant's Ex-
hibit 1,' and ask you if you can identify your signa-
ture on that docu1nent. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. lV[r. Halls, zcas that document signed in 
your presence as a Notary Public? 
''A. Well, I '''"ould say so, yes. 
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"Q. Were you acquainted with James F. Dal-
ton's signature aside from this notarized signature? 
"A. Yes, acquainted with James F. Not Minnie 
Pearl. 
"Q. Would you say that this is James F. Dal-
ton's signature? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Would you say that is Minnie Pearl Dal-
ton's signature? 
"A. I would say so if I acknowledged it, yes." 
It is quite apparent that the witness did not identify 
the signature by reason of the fact that she appeared be-
fore him and signed the deed, but from his. memory of 
James F. Dalton's signature, vvhich he had been familiar 
with many years previous. 
Defendants' Exhibit 2 shovvs on its face that deed was 
executed and signed on the 17th day of October, 1930 and 
delivered by Mr. Dalton to the bank in escrow. At the 
time of the deli very of the deed to the bank to be held in 
escrow the signatures of James F. Dalton and Minnie Pearl 
Dalton must have been put on the deed at that time. Now 
if Mr. and Mrs. Dalton were in the bank at the time the 
deed was signed and delivered to the bank to be held in 
escrow, it seems almost incredible that the bank did not 
require them to acknowledge the deed before it was. re-
ceived by the bank in escrovv, which most certainly is the 
practice of every bank. Every fact and circumstance in 
this transaction seems to indicate that even if the deed was 
signed by Mr. Dalton, Mrs. Dalton did not sign this pur-
ported deed. Defendants' Exhibit 2 purports to have type-
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written on the bottom of said instrument, under the signa-
ture of James F. Dalton, the purported original agreement 
to sell the property, and the instrument does not purport to 
be signed by Mrs. Minnie Pearl Dalton, so that it is undis-
puted that Mrs. Minnie Pearl Dalton never at any time 
signed any agreement to sell this property to Daniel Per-
kins. Now there is an escrow agreement appearing over 
the signature of James F. Dalton which recites that "I hand 
you herewith a deed," etc., signed only by James F. Dalton 
and it is not purported to bear the signature of Minnie 
Pearl Dalton. It seems only reasonable to assume that if 
Mrs. Dalton was actually in Monticello on the 27th day of 
October, 1930, the day they claim she signed the said deed, 
and was present when the deed was signed, it seems almost 
incredible that the bank and lVIr. Perkins would not have 
requested her to sign the escrow agreement also, at the 
same tin1e she signed the deed and the deed was delivered 
to the bank. Mrs. Dalton testified that she never at any 
time signed the said deed (Trans. 105). 
Riley Dalton, a son of J\iinnie Pearl Dalton, called as 
a witness, testified (T·rans. 74) : 
"Q. Calling your attention to about the 27th 










Living at Declo, Idaho. 
Where did you liYe previous to that? 
We lived in Montezun1a Canyon? 
Is that in Utah? 
That is in San Juan County. 
San Juan County. And when did you live 
In 1927. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
"Q. And you lived where in Idaho? 
"A. Declo, Idaho. 
"Q. How long did you live up there? 





"Q. Now, was your father and mother-do you 
recall them leaving Idaho at any time? 
"A. N . o, sir. 
"Q. Was it their custom to leave you alone 
and go places? 
"A. N . o, sir. 
"Q. Did they ever? 
"A. N . o, sir. 
"Q. Did they leave Idaho for any purpose or 
for any place, to go any place about 1930? 
"A. N . o, sir. 
"Q. During the year 1920? 
"A. N . o, sir. 
"Q. Now, how can you remember that? 
"A. 1ffy birthday is the 18th day of October, 
I was nine years and ten days old when that deed 
was supposed to be executed. We had the measles 
on my birthday. 
"Q. You had the measles on your birthday? 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. And you say your father and mother were 
both there? 
"A. My father and mother was both there. 
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"Q. Now did you-you came from Idaho in 
about 1931, is that true? 
"A. Yes, sir." 
Belva Isabel Conrad, a daughter of the plaintiff Minnie 
Pearl Dalton, testified (Trans. 86) : 
"Q. Now, calling your attention to the 27th 
day of October, 1930, do you know where you were 
living? 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. Where were you living? 
"A. I was living at Declo, Idaho. 
"Q. Declo, Idaho. Whom were you living with? 
"A. My mother. 
"Q. Your mother is Mrs. Minnie Pearl Dalton? 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. Now, why were you living with your 
mother at that time? 
"A. Because I had a young son, a young baby. 
"Q. And when was that baby born? 
"A. The 11th day of July, 1930. 
"Q. The 11th day of July, 1930? 
"Q. I show you what has been marked for 
identfication Plaintiff's Proposed Exhibit 2. Is that 
the birth certificate of your son? 
"A. That is the birth certificate of my son, 
Roy \V. Knudsen. 
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"Q. And he was born on the 11th day of July, 
1930 in Declo, Idaho? 
"A. y . es, sir. 
Belva Catherine Oliver, a daughter of Mrs. James F. 
Dalton, testified (Trans. 91) : 
"Q. And James Franklin Dalton. Calling your 
attention to the 27th day of October, 1930, where 
were you living? 
"A. I was living with my mother and father 
at Declo, Idaho. 
"Q. How long did you live there, for a consid-
erable time both before and after that? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. \Vhat makes you remember that you were 
there specifically on the 27th of November- ( Oc-
tober)? 
"A. Well, I had a love affair, I thought I was 
in love with a young gentleman at that time. His 
name was George King. And my brothers and 
mother all had the measles except I. 
"Q. Now, was it the practice of your father 
and mother to leave you and go away for a day or 
two at a time? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. They never did at any time? 
"A. Never. 
"Q. Particularly around the first to the 27th 
of October, 1930, did they leave you? 
"A. Neither my mother nor dad could never 
leave us at that time. 
"Q. Do you ever remember a time that they 
went and left you for a day at a time? 
"A. No. 
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"Q. Did they have a car? 
"A. Well, w-e had part of one." 
We submit that the evidence in this record clearly 
establishes that Mr. and Mrs. James F. Dalton never exe-
cuted the warranty deed ( Def. Ex. 1), and particularly 
Mrs. James F. Dalton. The evidence is entirely insufficient 
to sustain the court's finding that James F. Dalton and 
Minnie Pearl Dalton executed the said warranty deed, and 
most certainly is insufficient to support the finding that 
Mrs. lVIinnie Pearl Dalton ever signed and executed the said 
warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1), through which deed defen-
dants claim a chain of title to the property. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
ESCROW AGREEMENT (DEF. EX. 2) HAD 
BEEN COMPLIED WITH, AND THE WAR-
RANTY DEED D.i\TED OCTOBER 27, 1930 
AND ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED BY JAMES F. 
DALTON AND MINNIE PEARL DALTON, 
GRANTORS, AND LEFT IN ESCROW WITH 
THE SAN JUAN STATE BANK HAD BEEN 
VALIDLY DELIVERED. 
Defendants' Exhibit 2, which purports to be an escrow 
agreement executed by James F. Dalton and the San Juan 
State Bank, which escro\\r agreement was offered in evi-
dence by the defendant Max Dalton himself, conclusively 
proves that if James F. Dalton and Minnie Pearl Dalton 
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in fact executed the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) to Daniel 
Perkins on the 27th day of October, 1930, the deed was 
placed in the San Juan State Bank in escrow with instruc-
tions that the deed be delivered to Daniel Perkins upon 
the performancy by Daniel Perkins of the conditions of 
the agreement. There is absolutely no evidence in the rec-
ord that the conditions of the escrow agreement were ever 
performed by Daniel Perkins or any of the Perkins broth-
ers. 
By the great weight of authority, where a deed has 
been executed by the grantors and delivered by the grantors 
to an escrow agent, the title to the property does not vest 
in the grantee until all the terms and conditions of the 
escrow agreement have been complied with. The rule is 
stated in 30 C. J. S. page 1216: 
"It is frequently or broadly stated that the es-
crow takes effect as a fully executed instrument at 
the time it is rightfully delivered by the depository 
to the grantee, obligee, or payee. However it is 
held that an actual manual delivery of an escrow 
is not necessary to vest the title; that a constructive 
delivery may be sufficient and the instrument takes 
effect the moment the conditions have been per-
formed or the event happens upon which grantee or 
obligee is entitled to possession." 
In the case of Shelton vs. Stagg, (169 S. W. 2nd 550) 
the court said: 
"The law is well settled in this state and in the 
state of Wisconsin, as well as practically every other 
jurisdiction in the country, that where an instru-
ment is placed in escrow it cannot become operative 
until the conditions under which it was deposited 
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have been complied with or the contingency agreed 
upon has happened." 
In Bell vs. Rudd, (191 S. W. 2nd 289) the court held: 
"It is elementary that before a grantee or 
obligee can assert any rights under an escrow con-
tract, he must show that he has complied with the 
escrow." 
In Mississippi Highway Commission vs. Anderson, (184 
Southern 450) the court said : 
"Where a deed is given to a third person to be 
delivered as operative only upon the performance of 
specific acts by the grantee, there is no delivery that 
will place title until the specific acts have been 
performed as specified." 
The rule is also stated in 19 A. M. J. 437: 
"\Vhen an instrument has been deposited in 
escrow to be delivered to a designated person upon 
the performance of a certain condition or the hap-
pening of a certain event, it is the well-established 
general rule that the performance of the stipulated 
conditions or the happening of the event is essen-
tial in order to entitle the beneficiary to a delivery 
of the instrument, although in some instances by 
fiction of law and in the furtherance of justice it 
is allowed to take effect fro1n the first delvery." 
There is not one word of evidence in this record that 
the money was paid and the conditions of the escrow agree• 
ment performed, while Mrs. Dalton testified that no pay-
ments had ever been made to them under the terms of any 
agreement (Trans. 104). There is absolutely no evidence 
that the deed was ever delivered by the escrow agent, the 
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San Juan State Bank, to Daniel Perkins, the grantee named 
in the deed, or to any of the Perkins brothers mentioned 
in the escrow agreement. 
In order for the deed to be operative to convey the, title 
to the property to the grantee, there must be a delivery of 
the deed to the grantee and until the delivery was made 
the title did not pass. 
Now it may be conceded that possession of a deed by 
the grantee creates a presumption that the deed was de-
livered to the grantee, but this is only a presumption and 
may be rebutted (Stanley vs. Stanley, 94 P. 2nd 465). But 
this general rule that the possession of a deed by the grantee 
creates a presumption that the deed was delivered does not 
apply where a deed has been executed and placed in the 
hands of an escrow agent for delivery to the grantee upon 
performance by the grantee of the conditions of the escrow 
(16 A. M. J. 654). 
"The fact that a conveyance is found in the 
possession of a grantee does not give rise to the 
presumption of its delivery where the evidence shows 
that such conveyance, though signed by the grantor, 
was given to a depository with instructions respect-
ing it which as a matter of law show that the grantor 
did not part with the right to recall it in his life-
time." 
There is not one word of evidence in this record that 
the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) alleged to have been exe-
cuted by Mr. and Mrs. James F. Dalton, was ever in the 
possession of the grantee, Daniel Perkins, or any one of 
the Perkins brothers mentioned in the escrow agreement. 
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All the evidence shows is that eighteen years after the deed 
was executed it was found in the hands of Donald Adams. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to show how 
Donald Adams came into possession of the deed, from whom 
he obtained it, for whom he was holding it, or in what 
capacity he obtained and was holding the deed. 
Max Dalton testified (Trans. 40) : 
"Q. When did you first see the deed marked 
Exhibit 1? 
"A. When I had Don making up these quit-
claim deeds from Perkins. 
"Q. That is Donald Adams? 
"A. Donald Adams, and he had his quit-claim 
deed. 
"Q. The deeds from what Perkins? 
"A. Mrs. Hyrum C. Perkins and her children. 
"Q. Then what? 
"A. He said, 'I have the other deed,' and we 
got it, looked at it and noticed it wasn't recorded, 
and we took them both over and recorded them at 
the same time." 
It will be noticed that this discovery of the alleged deed, 
executed by 1\ir. and Mrs. Dalton and placed in escrow, 
first appears in the possession of Donald Adams, in 1948, 
eighteen years after it vvas placed in escrow, without any 
explanation as to how or from whom he received the deed. 
There is no evidence in the record that Donald Adams was 
holding the deed as a part of the papers of the H. C. Perkins 
estate except the statement of the defendant Max Dalton 
that Donald Adams had been the attorney for the H. C. 
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Perkins estate (Trans. 41) ; and as far as this record is 
concerned, in 1948, when this deed was found in the office 
of Donald Adams, it was found in the possession of a per-
fect stranger to the ti tie ; and there is no evidence that the 
deed (Def. Ex. 1) was ever delivered by the escrow agent 
to Daniel Perkins, grantee, or to any of the Perkins broth-
ers. We submit that if the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) 
was placed in escrow, it was incumbent upon ~he defendants 
to prove that the terms of the escrow had been performed 
and that the deed had been delivered by the escrow agent 
to Daniel Perkins, the grantee, or to some one of the Per-
kins brothers mentioned in the escrow agreement (Def. 
Ex. 2). 
We agree that the law is well settled that in a case, 
where there is no escrow agreement involved, the possession 
of the deed by the grantee creates a prima facie presump-
tion that the deed was delivered to the grantee, but no such 
presumption prevails where the deed executed by the gran-
tor is placed in the hands of a stranger to be delivered to 
the grantee. In the case of Lewis vs. Tinsley, ( 124 A. L. 
R. 459) the court said: 
"While it is natural and reasonable to presume 
from the possession of a deed that the title was de-
livered to the grantee by the grantor, and that the 
grantor intended to convey title, the fact here 
compels the question of whether this presumption 
of delivery which arises from the possession of the 
deed, should remain after it is shown that the deed 
was not placed in the possession of the grantee by 
the grantor but came to the grantee by the hands of 
a third person. The fact here is clear that the deed 
came into possession of Bert through the hands of 
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Mr. Buel, as stated above, the natural presumption 
is that if a person has possession of a deed in which 
he is named the grantee, that he obtained such pos-
session from the grantor, who, when he placed the 
grantee in possession of the deed, intended to convey 
title. Would this presumption continue when it is 
shown that the dee.d was not placed in possession of 
the grantee by the grantor, but came to his posses-
sion by some third person? It appears to us that 
when this fact (delivery by some person other than 
the grantor) is shown, that the underlying reason 
which justifies the presumption has ceased to exist." 
In Huber vs. Williams, (170 N. E. 195) the Illinois 
court held that if the deed is in possession of a third person 
at the grantor's death, that the grantee has the burden of 
proving delivery. In Evans vs. Taylor, (182 N. E. 809) the 
court held that the unexplained possession of a deed by a 
third party after the grantor's death raises no presumption 
of delivery and if custody of deed by any other person in 
whose possession it was left by the grantor was intended 
for grantee, it was incumbent upon the one claiming under 
deed to prove the delivery. In Eddy vs. Pender, (159 At-
lantic 727) it is held that possession of the deed acquired 
after grantor's death rebuts the presu1nption of delivery 
from possession of the instrument by the grantee. In Smith 
vs. Peltz, (51 N. E. 2nd 534) the Illinois court held that 
where possession of a deed is received by grantee after the 
death of grantor, there is no presumption of delivery, the 
facts constitute a prima facie case against a valid delivery. 
In the case of Leu·is vs. Tin.sley, (124 A. L. R. 459) the 
court said: 
"The- presumption of delivery of a deed shown 
to be in possession of the grantee is overcome when 
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it appears that it came to the grantee through the 
hands of a third person, as the presumption itself 
is that the deed was delivered by the grantor to the 
grantee. 
"The facts and circumstances attending the 
transaction must be such as to show that the grantor 
intended the deed to be delivered by the custodian 
to the grantee. The delivery to a third person raises 
no such presumption as that such delivery is for the 
use of the grantee, and it is incumbent on those 
claiming under the deed to make proof of the fact." 
In the case at bar the evidence shows that the deed 
purported to have been executed by James F. Dalton and 
Minnie Pearl Dalton (Def. Ex. 1) was executed on the 27th 
day of October, 1930 and placed with the San Juan State 
Bank in escrow. There is no evidence of payment for the 
property in accordance with the terms of the escrow agree-
ment, but Mrs. Dalton testified that there had never been 
any money paid to them under the terms of said agreement 
(Trans. 104). In 1948, Kisten Perkins, the widow of Hyrum 
C. Perkins, deceased, Dorothy P. Jones, Beverly P. Alex-
ander, Calvin J. Perkins, Richard C. Perkins, and Margaret 
P. Tennity, the heirs at law of Hyrum C. Perkins, conveyed 
the property in question by quit-claim deed to the defendant, 
Max Dalton. At the time of this conveyance, Donald Adams 
was n1aking up this quit-claim deed. Donald Adams, at that 
time attorney for the defendant Jtllax Dalton, told the de-
fendant Max Dalton that he had the other deed. This was 
eighteen years after the deed· was executed and three years 
after the death of James F. Dalton that the deed first ap-
peared unrecorded in the office of Donald Adams, without 
any evidence as to from who he received possession of the 
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deed. Can a court assume from a mere statement of the 
defendant Max Dalton that the deed was in the office of 
Donald Adams and that Donald Adams had six years earlier 
probated the estate of Hyrum C. Perkins, that the escrow 
agreement had been completed and the deed delivered to 
Hyrum C. Perkins, and that the deed was a part of the 
H. C. Perkins estate? We think not. 
H. C. Perkins died October 31, 1939, and letters of ad-
ministration were issued on November 28, 1939, and the 
final distribution of the estate was. made and the proceed-
ings closed on the 21st day of April, 1942 (Def. Ex. 5, p. 
13-14) and that the estate of H. C. Perkins had been closed 
six years before the deed was found in the possession of 
Donald Adams without any evidence to show when he came 
into possession of the deed or how he came into possession 
of the deed or from whom he obtained it. Certainly the 
mere fact that the deed appeared in Donald Adams' office 
six years after the probate proceedings had been closed 
would not justify the court in concluding that it was a part 
of the H. C. Perkins estate papers and had been delivered 
to H. C. Perkins during his lifetime. 
It seems almost incredible that if the terms of the es-
crow agreement had actually been complied with and the 
deed actually delivered by the bank to H. C. Perkins during 
the lifetime of the grantor, and the deed was a part of the 
papers of the H. C. Perkins estate, that Donald Adams, as 
attorney for the estate, \vould not have recorded the deed 
at least son1etime during the process of the administration 
of the estate. But eighteen years after the execution of 
the deed and six years after the estate of H. C. Perkins was 
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closed, the deed first appears in the possession of Donald 
Adams as a perfect stranger to the title. The defendant 
Max Dalton testified (Trans. 38) : 
"Q. How long have you had control of the 
property? 
"A. I bought it from the H. C. Perkins estate 
in 1941. 
"Q. What did you pay for the property? 
"A. $500.00, as I remember." 
The abstract of title shows that he did not buy the 
property from the I-I. C. Perkins estate, because the prop-
erty was distributed to the heirs of the H. C. Perkins estate 
in April, 1942. Six years after the estate of H. C. Perkins 
was closed the defendant took from the heirs of the H. C. 
Perkins estate a quit-claim deed when the heirs had a good 
and marketable title, as shown by the abstract of title (Def. 
Ex. 5). If there had been a compliance with the terms of 
the escrow agreement and the deed had actually been de-
livered to H. C. Perkins· during his lifetime and it was a 
part of the papers of the H. C. Perkins estate, it seems in-
credible that Donald Adams would have advised the de-
fendant Max Dalton, then his client, to take only a quit-
claim deed to the property (Trans. 43) . 
"Q. Then of course Kisten gave you the deed? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Why didn't you ask for a warranty deed? 
You had paid $500.00 for only a quit-claim deed? 
"A. Under advice of Donald Adams." 
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Under the advice of Donald Adams, the defendant Max 
Dalton took only a quit-claim deed. It seems almost incred-
ible that if the terms of the escrow agreement had been 
complied with and the delivery of the deed made to H. C. 
Perkins and the deed was actually a part of the H. C. Per-
kins estate, that Donald Adams would not have recorded 
the deed sometime during the process of probating the 
estate of H. C. Perkins, and there would have been no hesi-
tancy on the part of Donald Adams to advise the heirs of 
H. C. Perkins to give the defendant Max Dalton a warranty 
deed instead of a quit-claim deed to the property in October, 
1948. \Ve have in this case the unique situation where a 
deed executed in 1930 and placed with an escrow agent, 
and 18 years after its execution and three years after the 
death of James F. Dalton, and six years after the H. C. 
Perkins estate had been distributed and closed, the deed 
first appears in the hands of Donald Adams, one of the 
attorneys in this action, unrecorded, without any evidence 
whatsoever explaining how or when he obtained possession 
of the deed. We submit that under the facts in this record 
justice would require the defendant Max Dalton to prove 
by competent evidence that there had been in fact a de-
livery of the deed and that Donald Adams was holding the 
deed as a part of the papers of the H. C. Perkins estate and 
not as a perfect stranger to the title, before any presump-
tion could possibly arise that the escrow agreement had 
been complied with and that there had been a delivery by 
the bank to H. C. Perkins in accordance with the escrow 
agreement. We submit that the facts in this record over-
come any presumption of a delivery of the deed by the 
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escrow agent that might prevail, because of the deed being 
found in the hands of Donald Adams. 
If Donald Adams was the attorney for the H. C. Per-
kins estate and the deed (Def. Ex. 1) was found among the 
papers of the H. C. Perkins estate, evidence of payment 
would also have been with the deed among the papers of 
H. C. Perkins, if payment had in fact been made. Before 
the trial of this case the plaintiff submitted interrogatories 
for answer by the defendant Max Dalton (R. 9) : 
"Interrogatory No. 5 : If such an agreement 
was entered into and a deed executed on or about 
June 1, 1927, were they placed in escrow? If so, 
when? 
"Answer: We do not know." 
Since these answers were prepared by Donald Adams, 
defendant's attorney, it certainly can be presumed that 
neither Donald Adar.o.s or the defendant lVIax Dalton had 
defendants' Exhibit 2 in their possession at that tin1e, be-
cause the letter itself (Def. Ex. 2) was addressed to the 
bank and recites "I hand you herewith a deed," etc. 
"Interrogatory No. 7: If there was such an 
agreement, was payment made according to the 
terms of the agreement? 
"Answer: lVe do not know." 
Since Donald Adams had possession of the papers of 
the H. C. Perkins estate, if payment had been made he 
should have had the evidence of payment; but the defen-
dant answered that he did not kno"'N whether payment had 
been made or not. 
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We submit that the evidence in this record does not 
show that warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) was ever in the 
possession of Daniel Perkins or any of the Perkins broth-
ers mentioned in the escrow agreement, but that the deed 
was found in the office of Donald Adams, a perfect stranger 
to the title, and that the burden of proof was upon the de-
fendants to at least show by evidence that there had been 
a valid deli very of the deed by the escrow agent, and to 
whom the delivery was made. The defendants did not 
assume this burden. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT MAX DALTON HAD 
ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE PROPERTY BY 
VIRTUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Adverse possession is an affirmative defense and must 
he affirmatively pleaded (Civil Rules of Procedure (8-C)). 
The defendants filed and answer to plaintiff's complaint, 
but did not affirmatively plead adverse possession. At the 
trial of the case, leave was granted to amend the answer of 
the defendants Max Dalton and Nell Dalton, and the answer 
was. amended so as to include as an affirmative defense 
Sections 78-12-5 and 78-12-6, U. C. A., 1953 (Trans. 3). 
The trial court found in its findings of fact and con-
clusions of la\V that by reason of the provisions of Sections 
78-12-5, 78-12-6, 78-12-7, 78-12-8, 78-12-9 and 78-12-12, U. 
C. A. 1953, the plaintiffs were forever barred from claim-
ing any interest in the property. It cannot be determined 
\Vhether court's opinion was based upon the two sections 
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of the statute pleaded in the defendants,' answer, or one or 
more of those enumerated by the court and not properly 
pleaded by the defendants. 
Since neither of the sections pleaded by the defendant 
Max Dalton constitutes a defense under the evidence offered 
by the defendant, the plaintiffs had no burden of offering 
evidence and no evidence was offered by the plaintiffs on 
the question of adverse possession. 
The abstract of title (Def. Ex. 5) shows that the record 
title to the property was in the name of James F. Dalton 
until November 5, 1948, when the alleged deed from James 
F. Dalton to Danie1 Perkins (Def. Ex. 1) was recorded 
and the quit-claim deed of Kisten A. Perkins, Dorothy P. 
Jones, Beverly P. Alexander, Calvin J. Perkins, Richard C. 
Perkins and Margaret P. Tennity, heirs of Hyrum C. Per-
kins, to l\1ax Dalton (Def. Ex. 5, p. . . ) was executed and 
recorded. Plaintiff's action was filed on the 18th day of 
June, 1955, well within the seven years, so that at the time 
of the commencement of the action the plaintiff was seized 
of the property within seven years and well within the 
provisions of Sections 78-12-5 and 78-12-6, U. C. A. 
Since Sections 78-12-5 and 78-12-6 were the only sec-
tions affirmatively pleaded by the defendant Max Dalton 
the court committed error in applying the remaining sec-
tions of the statute enumerated by the court in determining 
the question of adverse possession by the defendant. But 
even if the remaining sections as set forth by the trial court 
but which had not been properly pleaded, are deemed to 
have been properly pleaded by the defendant Max Dalton, 
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there is still insufficient evidence in the record to justify 
the trial court's decision that the defendant Max Dalton 
had acquired title and the right of possession by virtue of 
adverse possession. 
Section 78-12-8, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"UNDER WRITTEN INSTRUMENT OR 
JUDGMENT.-Whenever it appears that the occu-
pant, or those under whom he claims, entered into 
possession of the property under claim of title, ex-
clusive of other right, founding such claim upon a 
written instrument as being a conveyance of the 
property in question, or upon the decree or judg-
ment of a competent court, and that there has been 
a continued occupation and possession of the prop-
erty included in such instrument, decree or judg-
ment, or of some part of the property under such 
claim, for seven years, the property so included is 
deemed to have been (held) adversely, except that 
when the property so included consists of a tract 
divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not 
deemed a possession of any other lot of the same 
tract." 
Max Dalton testified (Trans. 37) : 
"Q. When did you first go into occupancy of 
that property. First I will ask you this: Do you 
have possession of that property at the present 
time? 
''A. \V ell, I think so, yes. 
"Q. How long have you had control of the 
property? 
"A. I bought it fron1 the H. C. Perkns estate 
in 1941." 
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The alleged purchase of the property by the defendant 
Max Dalton from the Perkins estate was oral and there 
was no evidence offered of any written instrument of any 
kind evidencing the sale and purchase of the property in 
1941. It was by virtue of this alleged oral agreement with 
the Perkins estate that the defendant first entered into 
possession in 1941. So that clearly under the evidence the 
defendant entered into possession not under the terms of 
any -vvritten instrument, but purely under the terms of an 
alleged oral sale, and in order for the defendant Max Dalton 
to acquire title by adverse possession under circumstances 
such as these, where there is no written instrument, he 
would clearly have to comply with all of the provisions of 
Section 78-12-11. There is no evidence in this record that 
the defendant Max Dalton fenced the property or that he 
had cultivated the property or that he had expended any 
money on the property, one of which would clearly be nec-
essary under the provisions of 78-12-11. 
Section 78-12-9 provides : 
"WHAT CONSTIT·UTES ADVERSE POSSES-
SION UNDER WRITTEN INSTRUMENT.-For 
the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by 
any person claming a title founded upon a written 
instrument or a judgment or decree, land is deemed 
to have been possessed and occupied in the following 
cases: 
"{1) Where it has been usually cultivated or 
improved. 
"(2) Where it has been protected by a sub-
stantial inclosure. 
"(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been 
used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for 
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the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for 
the ordinary use of the occupant. 
" ( 4) Where a known farm or a single lot has 
been partly improved the portion of such farm or 
lot that may have been left not cleared or not in-
closed according to the usual course and custom of 
the adjoining county is deemed to have been occu-
pied for the same length of time as the part im-
proved and cultivated." 
This section sets forth the requirements that are nec-
essary in order for the defendant to have acquired title by 
adverse possession where he claims title by adverse posses-
sion, having entered into possession under a written agree-
ment. The defendant Max Dalton acquired a color of title 
to the property in question October 1, 1948 by virtue of a 
quit-claim deed from the heirs of the H. C. Perkins estate 
to the defendant Max Dalton (Def. Ex. 5, p. 15) and he 
continued in possession until the commencement of this 
action on June 18, 1955, a period of only six years and 
eight months, so that no title could vest in the defendant 
~J:ax Dalton by virtue of Section 78-12-9 because seven 
years had not elapsed between the acquisition of the title 
by virtue of the said quit-claim deed and the filing of 
plaintiff's complaint. The defendant Max Dalton was not 
only not in possession of the property for the full period 
of seven years as required in Section 78-12-9, but the nature 
of the defendant's possession was not of the nature as re-
quired by Section 78-12-9. There is no evidence that the 
defendant had made any improvements. There is no evi-
dence that the defendant had fenced the property. There is 
no evidence as to whether the property was fenced or un-
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fenced. The only evidence in the record concerning the occu-
pancy of the property was the evidence of the defendant 
Max Dalton who testified (Trans. 38) : 
"Q. What have you used the property for? 
"A. Well, it was kind of run down so we have 
used it for grazing livestock. 
"Q. Has it always been used for that purpose? 
"A. Well, when I was a little boy they had 
hayricks on it, and raised alfalfa. 
"Q. Who is 'they' you refer to? 
"A. I think my uncle Frank, which is James 
F. Dalton. He lived on it when I was a little kid." 
The only evidence offered on the question of use and 
occupancy was the defendant Max Dalton's statement that 
he had used the land for grazing. There is no evidence as 
to how much the land was pastured; whether it was winter 
or summer or just in the winter, whether the whole tract 
was pastured or only a part of it. There was absolutely no 
evidence that the defendant's pasturing of the land was 
exclusive, and that it had not also been pastured by the 
Daltons or others acting as their agents or others not acting 
as the agents of the Daltons. There is absolutely no evi-
dence sho-vving that the pasture of the land by the defen-
dant ]tiax Dalton was anything more than a mere trespass. 
The mere fact that the defendant l\fax Dalton had pastured 
the land in question, even if exclusively, is not sufficient for 
him to acquire title by adverse possession under Section 
78-12-9 (No. 3). There was no evidence offered by the 
defendant Max Dalton as to what the use of the land was. 
The only evidence on the subject offered at all was the 
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statement by the defendant Max Dalton that he had used 
the land for grazing, and it is evidenced from Mr. Dalton's 
own testimony that the land had previously been used by 
the Daltons for other purposes than grazing. The land was 
improved, cultivated ground. It had been used by the Dal-
tons for raising hay (Trans. 38). In the case of 221 Pac. 
2nd 1037, a recent Utah case, this court said: 
"The rule that title to real property may be ac-
quired by adverse possession if it is grazed by an 
adverse claimant during the grazing season is limited 
to land which, because of its character, are reason-
ably suited to grazing purposes only, and has not 
been extended by the courts to include lands which 
can be cultivated during non-grazing months of the 
~year.'' 
In order to acquire title to land by adverse possession, 
it is elemental that the possession of the one who claims 
adverse possession must show that his possession was ex-
clusive to that of all others. 1 A. M. J. 870 states this rule: 
"It is unanimously agreed that to be adverse 
the possession must be exclusive, not only as against 
the true owner, but also as against the whole world, 
except only the government." 
There is absolutely no evidence in this record that the 
possession of the defendant Max Dalton was exclusive. He 
merely stated that he had used the land for grazing. There 
is no evidence that the plaintiffs themselves or their agents 
had not also used the land for grazing during that same 
time. So the evidence in the record clearly fails to show 
that the possession of the defendant Max Dalton was ex-
clusive. 
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Adverse possession being an affirmative defense, the 
burden of proof was clearly upon the defendant to prove 
every single element of adverse possession ( 1 A. M. J. 925). 
The defendant Max Dalton testified that he owned the 
adjoining land and that he used the land for the purpose 
of grazing. There is no evidence even that the properties 
were separated by a fence. The using of plantiff's ground 
under such conditions would amount to nothing more than 
a trespass by the defendant Max Dalton. The use of prop-
erty for grazing under such circumstances would not give 
notice to the plaintiff that the defendant Max Dalton was 
claiming the property adversely to her under a claim of 
right. The occupancy must be of such as to reasonably give 
notice to the owner that the property is being claimed ad-
versely. In this case, the plaintiff's land and the land of 
the defendant were adjoining properties, and under the 
testimony of Max Dalton himself, the Dalton property has 
been used for cultivation for the purpose of raising hay, 
and the mere grazing of the plaintiff's land by the defen-
dant is not such an open and notorious use of cultivated 
ground and would give the plaintiff notice that her land 
was being claimed by the defendant Max Dalton. This rule 
is \Veil stated in 1 A. ~A:. J. 874: 
"§ 140.-NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY: 
One of the requisites of adverse possession is that 
the possession of the disseisor must be open and 
notorious. The mere possession of the land is not 
enough for this purpose. An adverse possession en-
tirely excludes the idea of a holding under the true 
owner. It is the knowledge, either actual or imput-
able, of the possession of his lands by another, claim-
ing to own them bona fide and openly, that affects 
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the legal owner thereof. It is, therefore·, essential in 
all cases that the owner shall have notice to that 
effect. If he has actual notice, that will, of course, 
be sufficient in itself. Where, however, there has 
been no actual notice, it is necessary to show that 
the possession of his disseisor was so open, notor-
ious, and visible as to warrant the inference that 
the owner must, or should have known of it; other-
wise, a mere trespass might be evidence of ouster." 
In the case of Perry Estate vs. Ford, (151 Pac. 59) this 
court followed the generally accepted rule that the posses-
sion of the defendant, in order to ripen into a title by ad-
verse possession, must be so open and notorious as to rea-
sonably give notice to the owner that the land was being 
claimed adverse to the owner. In this case the court said 
"The chief ground on which a disseisor acquires 
his title by adverse possession is latches of the 
owner, in seeing his boundary and land invaded by 
an adverse claimant and himself remaining passive 
and acquiescing in such adverse claim and asser-
tion. Hence the general rule that the possession of 
an adverse claimant must be continuous, exclusive, 
open, hostile and notoriops, and of such a character 
as to enable the owner to know of the invasion of 
his rights." 
Certainly under the facts of this case the mere grazing 
of the plaintiff's ground, which had been used by the plain-
tiff for farming, by the defendant Max Dalton, an adjoin-
ing neighbor, could not in and of itself be sufficient notice 
to the plaintiff that the defendants were claiming the 
property adversely. 
To acquire title to another's property by adverse pos-
session, the claimant must not only be in possession of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
property, but he must pay the taxes for seven years. The 
defendant lVIax Dalton first entered into possession, accord-
ing to his testimony, in the year 1941 under an oral agree-
ment of sale from the Perkins estate, but did not get the 
deed until 1948 (Trans. 38). So that from 1941 to 1948 
the property was assessed in the name of the Perkins estate 
and the defendant IVIax Dalton paid the taxes for the Per-
kins estate (Plaintiff's Ex. D). Now Defendants' Exhibit 
2, the escrow agreement, explicitly provided that the Per-
kins brothers would pay all the taxes during the life of the 
escrow agreement as part of their agreement with James 
F. Dalton, and if Max Dalton did in fact undertake to buy 
the property from the Perkins estate he was paying the 
taxes for the Perkins estate, who were bound under the 
escrow agreement to pay the taxes until such time as the 
escrow agreement had been complied with and the deed 
delivered. Since there is no evidence as to when the escrow 
agreement \Vas complied with, there is no evidence as to 
when the defendant Thfax Dalton commenced paying the 
taxes adversely to the plaintiff. The defendant Max Dalton 
acquired a quit-claim deed to the property on October 21, 
1948 (Def. Ex. 5, p. 15). Plaintiff's Exhibit D shovvs that 
the defendant Max Dalton paid the taxes for the year 1948 
for the Perkins estate, who were still bound under the 
escrow agreement to pay the taxes until the escrow agree-
ment was complied with, and there was no evidence as to 
when the escrow agreement was complied with. The de-
fendant Max Dalton received the deed to the property from 
the heirs of the Perkins estate on October 21, 1948, so that 
the first' taxes that were actually paid by Max Dalton that 
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were not being paid in compliance with the terms of the 
escrow agreement were paid by him for the year 1949. 
Now the taxes for the year 1955 were not due at the time 
of the filing of plaintiff's complaint, so that the defendant 
has not actually paid the taxes for seven years adversely to 
the plaintiff. 
SUMMARY 
The plaintiff in this action filed an action to quiet title 
to certain real property in San Juan County, Utah. The 
defendants Max Dalton and Nell Dalton filed an answer 
claiming ownership of the property and claiming title 
through a deed executed by James F. Dalton, dated October 
27, 1930 and recorded November 5, 1948. The defendants 
offered evidence that the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) pur-
ported to have been executed by James F. Dalton and l\1innie 
Pearl Dalton was placed in escrow with the San Juan State 
Bank. The plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton denies that she 
ever signed the said warranty deed or the alleged escrow 
agreement, or that they ever received any money according 
to the terms of said escrow agreement. That the evidence 
is entirely insufficient on which to base a finding that 
James F. Dalton and Minnie Pearl Dalton ever executed 
the warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1), and there is most certainly 
insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Minnie Pearl 
Dalton executed said warranty deed. 
Since the deed was not found in the possession of the 
grantee, the possession of the deed by the defendant creates 
no presun1ption that the escrow agreement had been com-
plied with and that there had been a delivery to the grantee 
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by the escrow agent, and the defendant failed to assume 
the burden of proving a valid delivery of the deed. 
The defendants. also claim title to the property by 
adverse possession, and the court so found. Adverse pos-
session is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. The 
defendants pleaded only Sections 78-12-5 and 78-12-6, U. 
C. A. 1953; and clearly since the plaintiff was the title 
holder until November 5, 1948 and the action was filed June 
18, 1955 the plaintiff was well within the seven-year period 
in bringing this action. 
The defendants have not acquired title by adverse pos-
session under any of the provisions of the Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. The defendants claim to have entered into 
possession of the property under an oral agreement of sale 
with the Perkins estate in 1941 (Trans. 38), and to have 
paid the taxes on the property since that time. The evidence 
does not show that the defendant Max Dalton complied with 
any of the provisions of Section 78-12-11 defining adverse 
possession not founded upon a written instrument. On 
October 21, 1948 the defendant Max Dalton acquired title 
to the property by a written instrument, a quit-claim deed 
from the heirs of the H. C. Perkins estate. But the defen-
dant had not been in possession under this deed for seven 
years prior to the commencement of this action by the 
plaintiffs, which action was filed June 18, 1955. 
The possession of the defendant was not of such a 
nature as to give the defendant title by adverse possession. 
The plaintiff's land was agricultural farm land used for 
raising hay (Trans. 38), and this court has heretofore ruled 
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that adverse possession of property by grazing alone- by 
an adverse claimant is limited to land that is suitable for 
grazing only (241 Pac. 1037). That the possession of the 
defendant Max Dalton of plaintiff's property was not so 
open and notorious as to give the plaintiff notice that it 
was being claimed adversely to plaintiff. There is absolutely 
no evidence that the defendant's possession was exclusive. 
That from 1941 to 1948 the taxes were paid by Max 
Dalton for the H. C. Perkins estate, (Plaintiff's Ex. D), 
and the I-I. C. Perkins estate was legally bound under the 
terms of the escrow agreement to pay the taxes until such 
time as the terms of the escrow agreement had been com-
plied with, and there is no evidence as to when the terms 
of the escrow agreement had been complied with, if they 
had been complied with at all. So that as it appears from 
this record, Max Dalton paid the taxes for the H. C. Per-
kins estate for the years 1941 to 1948, which was legally 
bound to pay the taxes. And the period from October 21, 
1948 when the defendant Max Dalton acquired a deed up 
to the filing of plaintiff's complaint on June 18, 1955 is a 
period of less than seven years, and there had only been 
six years' taxes due and paid by Max Dalton. The taxes 
for the year 1955 were not due and payable at the time of 
filing of plaintiff's complaint. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is insufficient evidence to sustain the court's 
. 
finding that the plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton and her de-
ceased husband sig-ned and executed a warranty deed (Def. 
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Ex. 1), and particularly the plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton. 
The warranty deed (Def. Ex. 1) never having been found 
in the possession of the grantee or any of the Perkins 
brothers mentioned in the escrow agreement (Def. Ex. 2), 
there was no presumption that the escrow agreement (Def. 
Ex. 2) had ever been complied with and the deed delivered 
to the grantees, and the burden of proof was on the defen-
dants to explain how the deed (Def. Ex. 1) came into the 
possession of Donald Adams, defendant's attorney, eighteen 
years after its execution, three years after the death of 
the grantor and six years after Donald Adams had com-
pleted probate proceedings of the estate of H. C. Perkins. 
The defendants did not assume that burden. The court 
committed error in finding the deed executed by James F. 
Dalton and the plaintiff Minnie Pearl Dalton (Def. Ex. 1) 
had been validly delivered and the defendants, being subse-
quent grantees, had acquired title to the property described 
in plaintiff's complaint. 
That the evidence in this record is insufficient to sus-
tain a finding that the defendant Max Dalton had acquired 
title to the property by adverse possession under the pro-
visions enumerated by the court of the Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND R. BRADY and 
DEAN E. FLANDERS, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
616 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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